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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over Mr. Blair's petition for review 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-a-3(2)(a) and § 34A-2-801(8). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Mr. Blair asserts that the Commission's denial of his proposed surgery was the 
result of multiple errors that culminated in upholding a defense that was not raised by the 
pleadings. In support, Mr. Blair asserts five issues: 
1. Issue: Mr. Blair put his industrial low back aggravations/injuries at L3/4 and 
L4/5 at issue when he asserted that these injuries were caused by the 
accident and required surgery, and Respondents' admission that there was no 
medical cause defense to these injuries waived their right to later challenge 
the nature and scope of Mr. Blair's admitted industrial injuries at L3/4 and 
L4/5. 
Standard of review: This Court should review the Commission's 
determination that Respondents did not waive their medical cause defense 
for reasonableness. Under the case of Barnard and Burk Group, Inc. v. 
Labor Comm % 2005 UT App. 401, If 5, 122 P.3d 700, 702, this Court 
reviewed the Commission's determination as to affirmative defenses for 
reasonableness and rationality. In that case, the employer argued that it had 
raised a statute of limitations defense in its answer. But the answer did not 
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contain the correct statutory citation or version of the affirmative defense. 
Nor did the answer state its defense with sufficient accuracy and detail so 
that the Petitioner and Division were fully informed of that defense. The 
Commission held that the defense was not raised under its Rules, and this 
Court affirmed. Similarly, Petitioner asserts that in this case, Respondents' 
Answer, which failed to identify the defense of medical causation, and 
instead, only defended the claim on whether the surgery was "appropriate," 
amounted to a waiver of that defense. Because medical causation between 
the accident and the low back aggravation/injuries at L3/4 and L/4/5 were 
admitted by Respondents, it was unreasonable for the Commission to raise 
the medical causation defense before the Medical Panel. 
2. Issue: The Commission applied the wrong legal standard (medical causation) 
to Mr. Blair's subsequent surgery claim, and in any case, Respondents' 
Answer waived medical causation as a defense to Mr. Blair's surgery claim. 
Standard of review: This Court should review the Commission's legal 
determination of the applicable standard for correctness because an agency's 
interpretation of legal standards are given no deference. See, e.g., State v. 
Wodscow, 896 P.2d 29 (Utah App. 1995) ("The issue of correct legal 
standard for binding over a defendant at a preliminary hearing is one of law . 
. . [T]his question is reviewed de novo with no deference to the district 
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court.") Similarly, the question of whether the Commission applied the 
correct legal standard to subsequent injury claims should be reviewed for 
correctness, and no deference should be given to the Commission's 
interpretation. Accord, Esquivel v. Labor Comm yn, 2000 UT 47. 
3. Issue: The Interim Findings were legally inadequate because they failed to 
set forth the undisputed facts that set forth Petitioner's industrial injuries, 
and subsequent eight year history of leg and low-back symptoms. 
Standard of review: If this Court agrees that Mr. Blair's industrial injuries 
were identified and admitted in the pleadings, then it should review the 
Commission's failure to find those facts under a reasonableness standard. 
Barnard and Burk, see discussion supra, at issue 1. Also, this Court reviews 
denial of benefits for substantial prejudice where the agency action is 
arbitrary and capricious. In the case of Adams v. Board of Review, 821 P.2d 
1 (UT App. 1991), this Court reviewed the Labor Commission's Findings of 
Fact for legal adequacy. In that case, the findings failed to identify the 
nature of the industrial claim, and what facts supported its conclusion that 
the injuries were not medically caused by the employees employment. This 
Court noted that the Commission's findings must disclose the steps taken by 
the Commission to evaluate the evidence so that reviewing courts may 
conduct a meaningful review. Similarly, in this case, this Court should 
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review the ALJ/Commission's findings that the accident was not the medical 
cause of Petitioner's L3/4 and L4/5 aggravation/injuries, and should 
determine whether the Commission's wholesale rejection of both admitted 
facts and undisputed medical and non-medical record evidence was an abuse 
of the Commission's discretion. 
4. Issue: The Commission's Findings were premised on legal error and 
inadequate as a matter of law because the Commission failed to explain why 
it rejected undisputed record evidence of Mr. Blair's eight years of leg and 
low-back symptoms following the accident, and when it found that Mr. 
Blair's leg symptoms had "essentially resolved" within months after the 
accident. 
Standard of review: If this Court agrees that Mr. Blair's industrial injuries 
were identified and admitted in the pleadings, then it should review the 
Commission's failure to find those facts under a reasonableness standard. 
Barnard and Burk, see discussion supra, at issue 1. Also, this Court should 
review the Commission's rejection of undisputed record evidence without 
explanation, for abusive discretion. Adams, see discussion supra at issue 3. 
This Court should also review the Commission's finding that Mr. Blair did 
not have an eight year history of leg and low-back symptoms, for abusive 
discretion. Under Adams, this Court must reverse if the findings failed to 
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disclose the steps taken by the Commission to reach its conclusions, 
including why it rejected undisputed record evidence. 
5. Issue: It is inappropriate to require marshaling of the evidence under Mr. 
Blair's facts because the findings as to leg and low-back symptoms were 
inadequate as a matter of law, and the finding that Petitioner's leg symptoms 
"essentially resolved" was premised on legal error and was not supported by 
substantial evidence. 
Standard of review: If this Court agrees that Mr. Blair's industrial injuries 
were identified and admitted in the pleadings, then it should review the 
Commission's failure to find those facts under a reasonableness standard. 
Barnard and Burk, see discussion supra, at issue 1. It is inappropriate to 
require appellant's to determine whether substantial evidence supported the 
flawed findings. Substantial evidence review presumes that the Commission 
did not abuse its discretion in objecting undisputed record evidence. 
Consequently, Mr. Blair does not need to marshal the evidence to challenge 
this finding. Martinez v. Media-Paymaster, 2007 UT 42, 164 P.3d 384 ^ 17-
20, 390-1. On the other hand, where there is no record evidence to support a 
Commission's finding, it is impossible to marshal the evidence. In this case, 
Mr. Blair found no evidence to support the Panel's conclusion that his leg 
and low back symptoms "essentially resolved" within months of his 
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accident. Accordingly, Mr. Blair has identified the undisputed record 
evidence, and that evidence supports the inescapable conclusion that this 
finding was not supported by substantial evidence. 
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-301. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401. 
UAR 602-2-1C. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature of the Case: 
This case presents multiple related issues that stemmed from the Commission's 
insistence on adjudicating claims and defenses that were resolved by the pleadings, and 
not presented for adjudication. Mr. Blair asserts that Respondents admitted the nature and 
scope of his low back injuries in their Answer when he put those injuries at issue and 
Respondents failed to challenge the medical cause of those injuries. Thereafter, the ALJ's 
findings failed to incorporate these admitted facts, and effectively raised medical causation 
as a defense to Mr. Blair's surgery claims, despite Respondents expressed waiver of that 
defense. The ALJ also failed to apply the correct legal standard of "contributing cause" 
for subsequent medical treatment, where the accident and injury were established, as here. 
The ALJ improperly delegated her fact finding duties to the Medical Panel. The Medical 
xi 
Panel's findings as to the nature and scope of Mr. Blair's industrial injuries were premised 
on legal error because the accident and his injuries had already admitted by Respondents. 
Its findings that Mr. Blair did not experience leg and low-back symptoms in the eight years 
following the accident, required it to reject the undisputed medical evidence and hearing 
testimony, and they did so without explanation. Its finding that Mr. Blair's low-back and 
leg symptoms had "essentially resolved" within months of the accident was contradicted 
by the undisputed medical evidence and Petitioner's undisputed testimony, and was not 
supported by substantial evidence. 
Court of Proceedings and Statement of Facts: 
On February 15, 2007, Petitioner / Appellant Ollie Blair, ("Mr. Blair"), brought a 
claim for low back surgery and injections, along with related temporary total disability 
compensation and permanent partial compensation following his surgery. In his 
Application, he asserted that he aggravated/injured his low back in the May 12, 1999 
industrial accident and that he needed low-back surgery at L3/4 and L4/5 as a result of his 
industrial injuries. ( R 1-7). Respondents Answer admitted that the accident was the 
medical cause of Mr. Blair's low-back aggravations/injuries. Respondents denied liability 
for recommended surgery because it would not relieve Mr. Blair's symptoms, and 
therefore was "inappropriate." ( R 10-18). The Petitioner was the sole witness at the 
hearing, and the parties stipulated to admission of the 94 page Medical Records Exhibit. 
(R 113). The parties represented that the central disputed was whether the proposed 
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medical treatment was "appropriate" and that this narrow issue required a referral to a 
Medical Panel. TR.53-55 ( R 113). 
From that point, Petitioner asserts that the case was asset by legal error and abusive 
discretion. On October 31, 2007, the ALJ entered her Findings of Fact and Interim Order. 
(R 36-39). Mr. Blair asserts that the findings were inadequate as a matter of law. The 
findings also failed to recognize Respondents' admission that Petitioners low back injuries 
at L3/4 and L4/5 were medically caused by the industrial accident. (R 10-18). On 
December 19,2007, in the Panel referral letter, the ALJ asked the Panel to determine 
whether the entirety of Mr. Blair's past and future medical treatment was medically caused 
by his industrial accident. ( R 59-60). On March 7, 2008, the Medical Panel issued its 
report. ( R 61-63). Petitioner asserts that the Panel made findings that rejected the 
uncontradicted evidence without explanation as to Mr. Blair's eight year history of leg and 
low-back symptoms, and that its conclusion that Mr. Blair's symptoms had "essentially 
resolved" within months of the accident was not supported by substantial evidence. 
On May 6, 2008, the ALJ accepted the Panel Report into evidence over Mr. Blair's 
objections, and issued her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order. ( R 73-77). 
That Order denied his claim for recommended surgery because Mr. Blair failed to prove 
that his industrial accident was the medical cause of his need for surgery. On June 5, 
2008, Petitioner filed his Motion for Review. (R 78-87). On June 25, 2008, Respondents 
filed their Reply to Petitioner's Motion for Review. (R 88-94). Petitioner's Motion for 
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Review was pending for over two years. 
On July 15, 2010, the Commission issued it Order Affirming ALJ's Decision. ( R 
108-111). That Order affirmed the ALJ's denial of the recommended surgery. The Order 
asserted that the Commission could accept the Panel Report into evidence, and that its 
Findings and Conclusions were adequate, and supported by substantial evidence. This 
appeal followed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Blair asserts that there were multiple related issues that arose from the 
Commission's insistence on adjudicating defenses that were waived in the pleadings and 
presented for adjudication. Mr. Blair argues that after he put his aggravations / injuries at 
L3/4 and L4/5 at issue in his Application for Hearing, that Respondents admission that the 
accident was the medical cause of his injuries established that the accident was the cause 
of his low bac aggravations / injuries at L3/4 and L4/5. Mr. Blair also argues that the 
ALJ's findings, which did not incorporate these admitted facts were premised on legal 
error, and that they were inadequate as a matter of law. Mr. Blair argues that the ALJ also 
erred when she asked the Medical Panel to determine the medical cause of Mr. Blair's 
need for surgery, and effectively raised medical causation as an affirmative defense to Mr. 
Blair's claims. Mr. Blair also argues that the ALJ erred when she applied the "medical 
cause" to a standard accident, instead of the "contributing cause" standard established be 
decades of appellant court precedent. Mr. Blair also argues that the Medical Panel's 
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findings were inadequate as a matter of law because the Panel rejected undisputed 
evidence without explanation to conclude that Mr. Blair did not suffer from leg and low-
back symptoms for the eight years following his industrial accident. Mr. Blair also argues 
that the Medical Panel's finding that his symptoms had "essentially resolved" within 
months of the accident, was contradicted by the undisputed record evidence and not 
supported by substantial evidence. Mr. Blair asks this Court to vacate the Commission's 
findings to the extent they adjudicated the medical cause of Mr. Blair's industrial low back 
injuries. Mr. Blair also asks this Court to remand the case for additional findings 
consistent with the undisputed record evidence and to submit the correct legal issue to the 
Medical Panel as to whether the proposed surgery was "appropriate" given Mr. Blair's 
admitted low back injuries. 
xv 
ARGUMENT 
THE COMMISSION'S DENIAL WAS THE RESULT OF MULTIPLE 
ERRORS THAT CULMINATED IN UPHOLDING A DEFENSE 
THAT WAS NOT BEFORE THE COURT. 
L Mr. Blair Asserted That His Industrial Injuries Included L3/4 and L4/5, 
and Respondents9 Admission That There Was No Medical Cause 
Defense Was Acquiescence To Those Medical Facts. 
This Court should hold that Respondents admitted that Mr. Blair's aggravations or 
injuries to his low back at L3/4 and L4/5 were part of his industrial injuries, when it 
waived its affirmative defense of medical causation. The MRI following the accident 
showed that Mr. Blair had bulging discs at L3/4 and L4/5, and a herniated disc at L5/S1. 
MRE 18 (R 112). Mr. Blair put the scope of his industrial injuries at issue when he 
presented medical evidence that connected his L3/4 and L4/5 aggravations or injuries to 
the industrial accident. ( R 1-7). Dr. Levitt opined that Mr. Blair needed surgery at these 
levels "as a result of the industrial accident." ( R 7). Respondents could have disputed 
whether the injuries to L3/4 and L4/5 were medically caused by the accident, but they did 
not. To the contrary, the Answer admitted that there was no medical causal defense to 
Petitioner's low back injuries. (R 10-18). Respondents failed to dispute that the accident 
was the medical cause of Petitioner's aggravations or injuries at L3/4 and L4/5.1 
1
 Had Respondents raised medical causation as a defense, then it would have 
been appropriate for the Commission to first determine the nature and scope of 
Petitioner's industrially caused injuries, and second, whether the proposed surgery was 
appropriate. Instead, Respondents only challenged Mr. Blair's surgery because they 
claimed it would not give him relief of his symptoms. See discussion infra, this Section. 
1 
Consequently, Respondents waived any right to dispute that Petitioner aggravations or 
injuries at L3/4 and L4/5 were caused by the industrial accident. 
Respondents' Answer specifically waived medical causation as a defense to Mr. 
Blair's surgery when they admitted liability for Mr. Blair's industrial low back injuries, 
and raised only whether the surgery was "appropriate" to treat his industrial injuries: 
The Respondents admitted liability for the Petitioner's claim. 
They understand that the issue is whether the Petitioner should 
have surgery to treat his industrial injury. Attached is a report 
from Gerald Moress, M.D., which concludes that surgery is 
not appropriate to treat the Petitioner's industrial injury. 
Answer at 1 ( R 10). Dr. Moress' report stated in pertinent part: 
I do not feel that a laminectomy/discectomy at L3-L4 and L4-
L5 will relieve Mr. Blair's discomfort. The discectomies 
would be done in order to relieve the discomfort in his left 
lower extremity where he has no clear evidence of 
radiculopathy based on reflex changes, atrophy, weakness, 
sensory dermatomal changes, or abnormal electrical study. 
Even if I assume that his discomfort in his leg was related to 
his disc disease, he would get no relief of his back pain from 
the surgery. He would be unhappy with that result. I do not 
feel that surgery is a good option for him. 
Answer at 8. ( R 17). In closing arguments, Respondents' counsel restated the foregoing 
admission of medical cause: "We don't dispute that the accident hurt his back, but with Dr. 
Moress's report, what he's saying is that the surgery is not appropriate to treat the 
industrial injury." Tr. 53 (R 113). Respondents never disputed that Petitioner aggravated 
or injured L3/4 and L4/5 in the accident. There was no medical cause or causal 
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contribution defense before the Commission.2 Instead, the defense was whether the 
proposed surgery was appropriate. 
In this case, the Commission simply got it wrong. It asserted that "Even though 
[Respondents] admit that the accident medically caused Mr. Blair to sustain a low-back 
injury, such an admission does not imply that the accident caused all of Mr. Blair's low-
back problems following the accident." Order Affirming ALJ's Decision ( R 109) at 2 (R 
109). But Respondent's waiver of its medical cause defense was not an "implication"; 
under the Commission's Rules, it was an admission against interest. Mr. Blair put L3/4 
and L4/5 at issue when he alleged that he needed surgery at these levels "as a result of his 
industrial accident." (R 7). Respondent's unqualified admission that the accident caused 
his low back injuries meant that the accident caused the specific aggravations / injuries 
plead by Mr. Blair "as a result of the accident." 
2
 Under the Commission Rules, 
The answer shall admit or deny liability for the claim and 
shall state the reasons liability is denied. The answer shall 
state all affirmative defenses with sufficient accuracy and 
detail that the petitioner and the Division may be fully 
informed of the nature and substance of the defenses asserted. 
UAR 602.2.1 C; Accord. Barnard & Burk v. Labor Comm % 2005 UT App 40 H 6 
(affirmative defenses are waived unless properly raised). The only defense Respondents 
raised in the pleadings and at hearing was whether the surgery was appropriate. If 
Respondents wanted to dispute whether the aggravations or injuries at L3/4 and L4/5 
were caused by the industrial accident, it had to state that defense with sufficient accuracy 
and detail so that the Petitioner and the Division were fully informed of that defense. 
Instead, they specifically waived that defense. 
3 
Under the Commission's own Rules, Respondents could only challenge the nature 
and scope of Mr. Blair's industrial injuries if it did so "with sufficient accuracy and detail" 
to "fully inform" Petitioner and the Commission of the "nature and substance" of its 
defense. UAR 602-2-1 C. Consequently, Respondents did not raise the affirmative 
defense of medical causation to Petitioner's aggravations or injuries at L3/4 and L4/5. The 
Commission erred when it failed to make findings of fact that reflected the facts and issues 
resolved by the pleadings and presented for adjudication. 
The Commission also countered that "[Respondents'] admission that the accident 
was the medical cause of Mr. Blair's injury does not preclude the Commission from 
adopting the medical panel's findings regarding the extent of Mr. Blair's work-related low 
back problems." Order Affirming ALJ's Decision (R 109) at 2. But that is precisely how 
issues are raised by the pleadings: Petitioners plead facts, and depending on which are 
admitted or denied by Respondents, the remaining disputes are left remain to be 
adjudicated. In this case the Commission was "precluded from adopting the medical 
panel's findings regarding the extent of Mr. Blair's work-related low back problems" 
because the pleadings did not leave that issue for adjudication. The Commission does not 
have discretion to ignore the parties' pleadings, and arbitrarily adjudicate facts not at issue. 
Instead, the Commission's discretion is bound by its own Rules governing pleadings, and 
by the disputes raised by the pleadings, and presented for review by the parties. In this 
case, the Commission committed legal error when it ignored its own Rules, and tried to 
4 
adjudicate issues that were already resolved by the pleadings. 
This Court should hold that Respondents waived their right to dispute whether 
Petitioner aggravated or injured L3/4 and L4/5 when they admitted that the accident was 
the medical cause of those injuries. Accordingly, this Court should also reverse the 
Commission's findings to the extent that they failed to find Petitioner's low back was 
aggravated / injured at L3/4 and L4/5 in his May, 1999 industrial accident. 
II. The Commission Applied The Wrong Legal Standard (Medical 
Causation) to Mr. Blair's Surgery Claim, And In Any Case, 
Respondents Did Not Raise Medical Causation As A Defense To Mr. 
Blair's Surgery Claim. 
This Court should reverse the Commission's denial of Mr. Blair's surgical claim for 
lack of medical causation, because it was the wrong standard under Mr. Blair's facts, and 
because Respondents did not raise a medical cause defense. 
The Commission errantly applied the medical cause test to Mr. Blair's surgical 
claims, and this Court should reverse the Commission's denial that was based on a lack of 
medical cause. Under the Allen case, employees must prove that their accident was both 
the legal and medical cause of their injuries, for the employer to be held liable for those 
injuries. Allen v. Labor Comm% 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). Medical cause is a 
requirement for compensable accidents; lack of medical causation is therefore a defense to 
a compensable accident. 
After having established a compensable accident, however, employers are 
responsible for "all medical [costs] resulting from that injury." McKean v. Mountain 
5 
States Casing, 706 P.2d 601, 602 (employer liable for second degree bums to employee's 
hand where industrial accident resulted in loss of feeling to right arm and hand). Put 
another way, after proving that they were injured by accident, employees need not prove 
that the industrial injuries were the sole cause of the need for their later medical treatment. 
Instead, it is well-settled that employers remain liable for the treatment if the industrial 
injuries merely "contributes" to the need for medical treatment. McKesson v. Labor 
Comm % 2002 UT App. 10, 41 P.3d 468.3 After the employee has established that the 
accident was the medical cause of their initial injury, then the employer is liable for the 
subsequent medical treatment if the original injury was a contributing cause of the need for 
that treatment. In this case, the Commission committed plain error when itapplied medical 
causation - instead of contributing cause - as the appropriate standard for Mr. Blair's 
3
 This Court explained that: 
To qualify for additional benefits after suffering a subsequent 
aggravation to a compensable workplace injury, a claimant 
need only prove that his "subsequent injury . . . [is] a natural 
result of [his] compensable primary injury." Id. Furthermore, 
a claimant need not "'show that his original tragedy was the 
sole cause of [his] subsequent injury.™ Id. at 845 (quoting 
McKean, 706 P.2d at 602) (emphasis added). Indeed, if the 
claimant can show that ""the initial work-related accident [is 
merely] a contributing cause' of the subsequent injury," Id. at 
845 (quoting McKean, 706 P.2d at 602), the claimant has met 
his burden. 
McKesson v. Labor Comm % 2002 UT App. 10, If 18, 41 P.3d 468, 472 (emphasis in 
original) (footnote omitted). 
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subsequent surgery claim. This Court should reverse the Commission's denial for Mr. 
Blair's surgery because it applied medical causation instead of contributing cause. 
Mr. Blair brought a claim for low back surgery resulting from his May 12, 1999 
industrial accident.4 Mr. Blair was forcefully pushing and pulling a 200 pound metal pod 
to center it over a baseplate, when he felt a pop, and his back tightened up. Mr. Blair was 
the sole witness at his hearing. He testified that he felt leg and low back symptoms shortly 
after the accident. Tr. 21-25 (R 113). He also testified that he continued to experience 
low back and leg symptoms in the eight years after the accident and before his hearing, 
and that his leg symptoms worsened to the point that his doctor recommended surgery at 
L3/4 and L4/5, as a result of his industrial injuries. Tr. 30-38 (R 113). Because there was 
no dispute as to the medical cause of Mr. Blair's industrial injuries, the appropriate 
standard was whether the industrial injuries contributed to the need for the proposed 
surgery. McKesson, 2002 UT App. at f 18. 
As set forth above, the Commission errantly believed it could ignore the parties' 
pleadings, and adjudicate the medical cause of Mr. Blair's low back injuries, even though 
that defense was not raised.5 Because it believed it could and should adjudicate the 
medical cause of Mr. Blair's low back injuries, the Commission did not address whether 
the appropriate standard for Mr. Blair's subsequent surgery claim was "contributing 
4
 Mr. Blair also asserted claims for temporary total disability compensation, 
permanent partial compensation, and other related medical expenses. (R 1-7). 
5
 See discussion, supra, Part A. 
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cause" instead of "medical cause." See generally, Order Upholding ALJ's Denial. (R 
108-11). 
It is well-settled that where a compensable injury occurred, the employer is liable 
for subsequent medical treatment if the injury was merely a contributing cause of the need 
for the treatment.6 Consistent with the pleadings, this Court should hold that Mr. Blair's 
injuries were medically caused by his industrial accident. Accordingly, this Court should 
also hold that the Commission erred when it applied the medical causation standard to Mr. 
Blair's subsequent surgery claims, and that it should have applied the contributing cause 
standard, consistent with well-settled Utah law. This Court should reverse the 
Commission's decision and remand Mr. Blair's case for further proceedings. 
* * # 
Having established the narrow disputes to be adjudicated, it was the ALJ's job to 
make adequate findings of fact and refer to the panel the question of whether the proposed 
surgery was appropriate. But the interim findings were inadequate because they failed to 
set forth Mr. Blair's undisputed objective medical findings of intervertebral disc injuries at 
multiple levels, and undisputed history of medical treatment with residual left leg 
symptoms over the following eight years, culminating in recommended low back surgery. 
See n.l supra, and discussion therein. 
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III. The Interim Findings Were Legally Inadequate Because They Failed To 
Set Forth The Undisputed Facts That Demonstrated Petitioner's 
Industrial Injuries, and Subsequent Eight Year History Of Low Back 
And Leg Symptoms. 
The ALJ's Interim Findings of Fact7 were inadequate as a matter of law, because 
they failed to make any findings regarding the nature and scope of Mr. Blair's admitted 
low back injury, and omitted his subsequent eight year history of low back and leg 
symptoms that culminated in his surgical recommendation. 
In order for us to meaningfully review the findings of the Commission, the 
findings must be "sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to 
disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was 
reached." Acton v. Deliran, 137 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Rucker 
v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1979)).... [T]he failure of an agency to 
make adequate findings of fact in material issues renders its findings 
"arbitrary and capricious" unless the evidence is "clear, uncontroverted and 
capable of only one conclusion." Id. (quoting Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 
233, 236 (Utah 1983)). 
Nyrehn v. Industrial Comm% 800 P.2d 330, 335 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 
241 (Utah 1991) (emphasis added). But in the case at bar, the ALJ literally made no 
findings as to the nature and scope of Mr. Blair's admitted industrial injury, and no 
findings as to Mr. Blair's eight year history of industrial low back and leg symptoms. 
The Interim Order contained the following relevant findings after Mr. Blair's 
industrial accident: 
7
 While the Commission, and not the ALJ, is the ultimate finder of fact, the 
deficiencies in the ALJ's Interim Order led to error and confusion by the medical panel, 
were adopted by the ALJ, and never corrected by the Commission. Order Upholding 
ALJ's Denial (R 108-11). 
9 
However the next morning the Petitioner had enormous pain in 
his back. He reported the accident and took the day off. 
Shortly thereafter the Petitioner went to see Dr. Carston 
Johnston. The Petitioner felt numbness going down the back 
of his left thigh (the diagram on ME p. 79 showing the pain as 
in the right thigh is incorrect). 
Over the years the Petitioner sought treatment for his low back 
now and then when it would "act up." Eventually surgery was 
recommended by Dr. Jodie Levitt. 
Findings of Fact and Interim Order at 2 (R 37). In other words, there were no findings as 
to the nature and scope of Mr. Blair's low back injury, and no findings as to his eight year 
history of leg and low back symptoms after the accident. 
The Interim Order contained no findings as to the nature and scope of Petitioner's 
admitted industrial injury. This failure prejudiced Mr. Blair because the Panel was left to 
guess what injuries Petitioner sustained or aggravated in the accident. The statute makes 
employers liable for injuries and aggravations.8 The post-accident MRJ disclosed three 
low back conditions: bulging disc at L3/4, bulging disc at L4/5, and a large disc herniation 
at L5/S1. MRE 36, 10 ( R 112). The pleadings established that Mr. Blair's low back was 
aggravated / injured at L3/4, L4/5, and L5/S1. But there were no findings as to Mr. Blair's 
multiple bulging discs at L3/4 and L4/5, or his large disc herniation from the industrial 
8
 Employers are liable to employees for "any accident or injury or death, in 
any way contracted, sustained, aggravated, or incurred by the employee in the course of or 
because of or arising out of the employee's employment...." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-
105. The Commission's law-trained ALJs are aware of the statute's purposefully broad 
formulation, and it is their duty to find the relevant facts to give effect and purpose to the 
statute; not to abdicate their fact-finding role to doctors. 
10 
accident. 
The Interim Order contained no findings as to Mr. Blair's low back and leg 
symptoms for the eight years following the accident. This failure prejudiced Mr. Blair 
because the panel was left to guess what symptoms Mr. Blair exhibited, and whether those 
symptoms reasonably supported the proposed surgery. The medical records exhibit 
contained over ninety pages of medical records that detailed eight years of Mr. Blair's low 
back and leg symptoms that followed the accident, including more than twenty (20) 
mentions of left leg and low back symptoms between Mr. Blair's accident and the 
hearing.9 Starting with his first visit to the doctor two days after his accident, MRE 83-4 ( 
(1) 5-6/99, MRE 74, 75, 77, 78, 80, 83-4; 
(2) 9/99, MRE 36, 38; 
(3) 10/99, MRE 34; 
(4) 8/02, MRE 90-93; 
(5) 9/02, MRE 86, 88; 
(6) 5/04, MRE 68; 
(7) 2/05, MRE 61; 
(8) 3/05, MRE 59; 
(9) 7/05, MRE 55; 
(10) 1/06, MRE 50; 
(11) 3/06, MRE; 
(12) 4/06, MRE 23; 
(13) 5/06, MRE 26; 
(14) 6/06, MRE 22; 
(15) 9/06, MRE 46; 
(16) 12/06, MRE 44; 
(17) 1/07, MRE 45; 
(18) 1/07 MRE 19; 
(19) 1/07, MRE 1; and, 
(20) 4/07, MRE 41. 
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R 112), Mr. Blair's left leg symptoms were mentioned in more than twenty separate 
locations in the 94 page medical records exhibit that spanned eight years. From the 
Interim Order, however, it appeared that Mr. Blair had left leg symptoms only when he 
saw Dr. Johnson shortly after the accident. (R 37). Mr. Blair was prejudiced by the 
Interim Order's failure to make appropriate, detailed findings of fact as to the undisputed 
history of leg symptoms contained in the medical record, and Petitioner's undisputed 
hearing testimony. 
The ALJ's failure to identify the undisputed facts in the Interim Order resulted in 
prejudicial and needless questions to the Panel. As set forth above, Respondents did not 
dispute the nature or scope of Petitioner's industrial low back injury. To the contrary, they 
paid for all of Mr. Blair's medical treatment until the surgical recommendation. The 
central dispute was whether the proposed surgery was "appropriate." There was no 
dispute as to Mr. Blair's entire industrial medical treatment history. 
But the ALJ asked the Panel asked whether all of Mr. Blair's medical treatment 
since the accident was due to his accident. Panel Referral Letter (December 19, 2007) at 2 
(R 60). This was prejudicial to Mr. Blair because the central issue presented for 
adjudication was whether the surgery was appropriate; the parties did not put Mr. Blair's 
entire industrial medical treatment history at issue. 
Similarly, Mr. Blair sought approval for his proposed surgery, along with pain 
clinic visits and/or epidural injections. MRE 18-18A (R 112). But the ALJ asked the 
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panel to identify Mr. Blair's all of future medical treatment from the accident - without 
limitation. Panel Referral Letter (December 19, 2007) at 2 ( R 112). The parties' 
pleadings and evidence did not require the ALJ to determine all of Mr. Blair's past and 
future medical treatment. Both questions were prejudicial because they ignored 
Respondent's admission that the industrial accident was the medical cause of his low back 
injuries, and that they only disputed the proposed surgery and related care because they did 
not think Mr. Blair would have a good outcome. ( R 10, 17). By putting all of Mr. Blair's 
past and future medical treatment at issue, the ALJ ignored the pleadings and evidence, as 
well as Respondent's limited defense to Petitioner's limited claims. The panel referral 
letter effectively raised the defense of medical causation, even though that was conceded 
by the Respondents. 
This Court should find that the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously when 
it failed to make essential findings before referring the case to the medical panel. In 
particular, it was arbitrary and capricious to make no findings as to the nature and scope of 
Mr. Blair's admitted industrial low back injuries, including bulged discs at L3/4 and L4/5, 
and his herniated disc at L5/S1. It should also find that the Commission acted arbitrarily 
and capriciously when it failed to make findings as to Mr. Blair's eight year history of leg 
and low back symptoms, as detailed in numerous entries in the medical records exhibit, 
and as Petitioner testified at the hearing. This Court should also find that the Commission 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it asked the medical panel to opine on all of Mr. 
13 
Blair's past industrial medical treatment, when Respondents did not dispute Mr. Blair's 
past medical care. This Court should also find that the Commission acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously when it asked the panel to opine on all of Mr. Blair's future care - without 
limitation - when he only asked for surgery and injections. By raising issues before the 
medical panel that were well beyond those presented for adjudication, the Commission 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously. This Court should remand the case, and require the 
Commission to enter detailed findings, consistent with the pleadings, medical records, and 
Mr. Blair's undisputed testimony at the hearing. This Court should also remand the case 
to determine only the issues presented for adjudication, and not all of Mr. Blair's past and 
future related medical treatment. 
IV. The Commission's Findings Were Premised On Legal Error And 
Inadequate As a Matter Of Law, Because "Failed To Explain Why It 
Rejected Undisputed Record Evidence That Showed Mr. Blair's Eight 
Years Of Leg Symptoms After the Accident When It Found That His 
Leg Symptoms Had "Essentially Resolved" Within Months After The 
Accident 
This Court should hold that the Commission's findings of fact were premised on 
legal error, because they failed to reflect the nature and scope of Mr. Blair's industrial 
injuries as set forth in the pleadings. The findings were also inadequate as a matter of law 
because the panel (nor the ALJ, nor the Commission) failed to explain why it discounted 
or ignored otherwise uncontradicted evidence of Mr. Blair's eight year history of leg and 
low back symptoms. At shown above, the Interim Order contained no findings as to the 
nature and scope of Mr. Blair's industrial low back injuries, or his history of leg and low 
14 
back symptoms. 
The ALJ abdicated her fact-finding role when she referred the case to the Panel. 
The referral letter stated to the Panel: 
[Y]ou are not bound by the discussion of the medical evidence. 
You are bound by the Findings of Fact with regard to the facts 
of this case. The facts are the historical and other legal data 
regarding how the injury occurred, dates and times, places, 
persons involved, and other related information commonly 
thought of as the situational circumstances surrounding the 
alleged injury. If you discover additional facts which are not 
contrary to the facts in the Findings of Fact and Interim 
Order, and you use them in your examination and evaluation, 
it will be necessary to include them in your report and explain 
how the additional facts affected your analysis and 
conclusions. 
Panel referral letter at 2 (emphasis added). Given that there were no findings as to the 
nature and scope of Mr. Blair's industrial low back injuries, and no findings as to his eight 
year history of leg and low back symptoms, the letter invited the Panel to make those 
findings for the ALJ. 
The ALJ/Commission may not abdicate its duty to make findings of fact. The 
Supreme Court has recognized that the ALJ/Commission is the finder of fact, and not the 
medical panel: "The panel of course performs an important function in giving the 
Commission the benefit of its diagnosis relating to those matters that are particularly 
within the scope of its expertise. But that is the extent of its prerogative. The final 
responsibility of making the decision as to the issues in such a proceeding is given to the 
Commission." IGA Food Fair v. Martin, 584 P.2d 828 (1978) (disregarding panel legal 
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conclusion as to whether work activities were "unusual" on day of accident). This Court 
stated that: "While the ALJ/Commission may convene a medical panel to review 
applicants' medical condition, the ALJ/Commission may not abdicate its fact-finding 
responsibility to the medical panel." Speirs v. Southern Utah University, 2002 UT App 
389, % 10, 60 P.3d 42, 44 (upholding medical panel determination where the parties' 
stipulated facts were presented to the panel). But in this case, the Court tried to delegate 
its fact-finding duty to the medical panel on critical factual issues. The results were 
disastrous, and illustrate why the ALJ/Commission - and not doctors - must discharge 
their legal duty as the ultimate finder of fact. 
The undisputed evidence demonstrated Mr. Blair's eight year history of leg and low 
back symptoms, but the panel found that these problems went away within months of the 
accident: 
Based upon review of the medical/chiropractic records, the 
medical panel finds that Mr. Blair did sustain on (sic) injury on 
5/12/99. He describes a pop followed by severe back pain and 
left lower extremity pain the next day. The first imaging study 
done thereafter is dated 8/9/99 (sic) and showed a very large 
disc protrusion at the L5/S1 level, consistent with those 
symptoms. Subsequent to that, however, his symptoms 
essentially resolved, including leg pain. Beyond that time, 
symptoms are documented only by chiropractors, who provide 
evidence of back pain only (not leg symptoms). Imaging 
studies done later show resolution of the disc protrusion at L5-
Sl, and the progression of degenerative disc disease at levels 
above L5-S1. The claimant's pattern of symptoms over time 
has been consistent with degenerative disc disease, which 
would be a pre-existing condition not caused by the accident in 
1999. Therefore, the medical panel finds that the medical care 
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provided through 6/9/2000 was reasonably related to the 
incident in question. Treatment after 7/2000 is clearly related 
to exacerbations of the pre-existing condition - degenerative 
disc disease. The disc protrusion apparently caused by the 
incident in 1999 has resolved. 
Medical panel report at 1 (R 62) (emphasis added). It was the ALJ/Commission9s legal 
duty to find the facts, and was error and folly for the ALJ/Commission to try to delegate 
that duty to a doctor.10 It was irrational to expect the panel doctor to make legally 
10
 Even if it were permissible, it is degrading to the parties and the process 
when judges farm out the essential functions of their office, and are ratified by the 
Commission. As Judge Orme wrote in the context of law-trained counsel preparing 
decisions for ALJ's signature, 
Utah ALJs generally — and those adjudicating workers 
compensation cases in particular — have routinely prepared 
their own findings and conclusions. Their work product has, 
with rare exceptions, been excellent, not only because 
findings prepared by the actual fact finder are inherently 
better than those prepared by a nonneutral delegee one step 
removed from decisional responsibility, see generally United 
States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 656 & n. 4, 
84 S.Ct. 1044, 1047 & n. 4, 12 L.Ed.2d 12 (1964), but also 
because continual feedback from the Industrial Commission 
and from this court, as well as the skill that comes with 
repetition and practice, help insure findings that are 
sufficiently detailed and otherwise "more helpful to the 
appellate court [I]t would be a shame if ALJs for state 
administrative boards and agencies were to reverse direction 
and begin regularly delegating the responsibility to counsel. 
Whitear v. Labor Comm % 973 P.2d 982 (Utah App. 1998)(Orme, J., dissenting in 
part)(footnote omitted). If it was bad policy for law-trained counsel to prepare findings 
fact for ALJs, it is worse when non-lawyers do so. With due respect to the able medical 
experts who staff the medical panel, it is disheartening to the parties and their counsel 
when the ALJ's most important task - finding the facts - is delegated to non-lawyers. 
17 
adequate findings because he was not law-trained and it was not his job to do so. Further, 
the panel doctor did consider all of the evidence: He did not attend the hearing, and did not 
evaluate the witness, much less hear Petitioner's testimony about his accident or 
subsequent eight year history of leg and low back symptoms. Further, the panel doctor 
could not have become aware of that history due to the Interim Order's lack of findings.11 
It was arbitrary and capricious to for the ALJ to foist fact-finding onto a physician, who 
was not law-trained and did not hear the parties' testimony. 
The medical records demonstrated Mr. Blair's consistent leg and low back 
symptoms, beginning with his date of accident, and continuing until the time of hearing. 
The panel found that Petitioner's symptoms resolved after his September, 1999, MRI. 
Medical Panel Report at 1 (R 62). But of the twenty-plus mentions of leg pain in the 
medical records exhibit, eighteen of them occurred after the September, 1999 MRI - the 
date the panel said that Mr. Blair's low back and leg symptoms "essentially resolved." 
Medical panel report at 1 (R 62). Despite the numerous mentions of left leg symptoms in 
the medical records exhibit, the panel made no attempt to reconcile its statement that Mr. 
Blair's symptoms had "essentially resolved" with the record evidence that demonstrated 
eight years of leg and low back symptoms that culminated in his surgical recommendation. 
The panel also rejected evidence of leg and low back symptoms because they were 
documented "only by chiropractors" with no explanation as to why that evidence should be 
11
 See discussion supra, Part II. 
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disregarded. 
Clearly, the panel rejected the medical evidence of Mr. Blair's leg and low back 
symptoms to reach its conclusion that his symptoms had resolved by 1999. But it offered 
no explanation for its actions; a reviewing court can not determine if the evidence was 
even considered, much less how it was weighed by the panel. The ALJ/Commission did 
not explain the obvious contradictions between the medical evidence that showed Mr. 
Blair's history of leg and low back symptoms, and the panel's conclusion that those 
symptoms resolved within months of the accident. Under similarly undisputed evidence, 
the Supreme Court has directed that the Labor Commission can not "arbitrarily [] 
discount all competent, uncontradicted evidence. We think it can% but did so here, calling 
for a reversal." Baker v. Indus. Comm 'n, 17 Utah 2d 141, 144 (1965) (emphasis in 
original)(employee's indefinite statements as to cause of injury, in connection with other 
undisputed evidence, did not defeat her claim). But in this case, the only rationale offered 
by the ALJ/Commission to reject the undisputed medical and non-medical evidence, was 
that the panel was "impartial," and that its "findings are based on the evidence in the 
record." Order Affirming ALJ's Denial at 2 ( R 109). But that statement begged the 
12
 For example, on a chiropractic treatment note dated 8/26/2002, there was a 
pain diagram that showed the low back circled, and a wavy line down the back of the left 
leg, with the following notation: "WIC 5-12-99. lifting plate metal moving it around, 
pain started that evening, ruptured disc.sharp, needles down leg, pain calf radiating to L 
leg." MRE 93 (R 112). Consistent with Mr. Blair's undisputed hearing testimony, he 
experienced ongoing low back and leg symptoms since his industrial accident, and these 
symptoms were documented by his medical providers. The panel simply disregarded this 
evidence without explanation. 
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question of the adequacy of the findings themselves, and did not speak to why much of 
Mr. Blair's supporting evidence was rejected, and how the remaining evidence was 
weighed. 
The findings were not "sufficiently detailed to disclose the steps by which the 
ultimate factual conclusions . . . [were] reached. Without such findings, this Court cannot 
perform its duty . . . of protecting the parties and the public from arbitrary and capricious 
administrative action." Adams, 821 P.2d at 5. This Court should find that the findings as 
to the nature and scope of Mr. Blair's industrial injuries, and his symptom history that 
culminated in his surgical recommendation, were inadequate as a matter of law. This 
Court should remand the case for additional detailed findings as to the nature and scope of 
Mr. Blair's industrial low back injury, and his history of leg and low back symptoms, 
consistent with the pleadings and undisputed record evidence. 
V. It Is Inappropriate to Require Marshaling Of The Evidence Under Mr. 
Blair's Facts. 
JL Assuming Arguendo That The Pleadings Did Not Resolve The Nature 
and Scope of Mr. Blair's Industrial Injuries, The Panel's Failure To 
Disclose Why It Rejected Undisputed Record Evidence of 
Petitioner's Aggravation / Injuries at L3/4 and L4/5 Makes 
Marshaling The Evidence Inappropriate. 
Mr. Blair takes issue with the findings both as to 1) the nature and scope of his 
industrial injury, and 2) as to his eight year history of leg and low back symptoms, for the 
reasons set forth above. Mr. Blair asserts that his industrial injury encompassed the 
aggravations / injuries at L3/4 and L4/5, along with his herniated disc at L5/S1. This issue 
20 
was resolved as a matter of law by the pleadings. 13Assuming arguendo that this was an 
open question, however, the medical panel only acknowledged the L5/S1 disc injury. The 
same MRI that disclosed the herniated disc at L5/S1, also showed disc bulges at the two 
levels above the herniation: L3/4 and L4/5. (MRE 10, R 112). The statute encompasses 
both aggravations and discrete injuries under accident claims. Consequently, the issue was 
not whether the panel's finding was supported by substantial evidence; instead, the issue 
was why the panel did not also include Mr. Blair's disc bulges or alternatively, if the 
bulges were present, why the panel did not also find that those adjacent discs were 
permanently aggravated in the accident. The panel did not explain why it included only 
one (L5/S1) of the three damaged discs as part of Mr. Blair's industrial injuries, and 
excluded aggravations/injuries to the other two damaged levels (L3/4 and L4/5). It is 
inappropriate to require marshalling of the evidence where the findings were incomplete, 
because some evidence supported the incomplete findings, while other evidence was either 
never considered, or rejected without explanation.14 
2. Marshaling The Evidence In Support Of The Finding Is Only Possible 
Where There Was Supporting Evidence, And Because Mr. Blair 
Found None. Marshaling Was Either Impossible, or The Finding Was 
Not Supported By Substantial Evidence. 
Similarly, Mr. Blair challenges the Panel's finding that his low back and leg 
symptoms "essentially resolved" within months of the accident because his testimony and 
13
 See Discussion supra, Part A. 
14
 See Discussion supra, Part C. 
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112). In May, 2004, Mr. Blair stated that he still had "pain in lower back and tingling 
down left leg. MRE 68 ( R 112). In February and March, 2005, there were pain diagrams 
that show low back and left leg symptoms, and Mr. Blair's complaint was still "lower back 
pain" and "left leg tingling." MRE 61, 59 ( R 112). His doctors noted left leg and low 
back pain in July, 2005, MRE 55 ( R 112), in January, 2006, and March 2006, MRE 50, 49 
(R112). 
In April, 2006, Mr. Blair complained of low back and leg problems to Dr. Jodie 
Leavitt, and continued into May and June, 2006. MRE 23, 26, 22 (R 112). In September, 
Dr. Davis again noted low back and leg problems. MRE 46 ( R 112). Dr. Davis took Mr. 
Blair off work in December, 2006, noting "lower back pain & spasms & leg pain with 
numbness and tingling." and noted continuing low back and leg problems in January, 
2007. MRE 44, 45 ( R 112). Those symptoms were again confirmed by Dr. Jodie Leavitt. 
MRE 19 ( R 112). Dr. Davis took Mr. Blair off work again in April 2007 because of 
"lower back and leg pain." MRE 41, 42 (R 112). 
Even Respondents' examining physician, Dr. Moress, did not dispute Mr. Blair's 
history of leg and low back symptoms since the accident. To the contrary, Dr. Moress 
described Mr. Blair as having "intermittent back pain" since his May, 1999 industrial 
accident. MRE 16. Mr. Blair testified at his July, 2007 hearing, that he had never been 
pain-free since the accident. Tr. 31 (R 113). 
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16 See discussion, Mipfti, l\iri f 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should vacate the Commission's 
Findings of Fact to the extent they conflict with the industrial injuries admitted in 
Respondents Answer, and find that its actions exceeded the bounds of reasonableness and 
rationality. This Court should also find that the Commission applied the wrong legal 
standard (legal causation) to Mr. Blair's subsequent surgery claim and that in any case the 
medical cause defense had already been waived. This Court should find that the 
Commission abused its discretion and that the Commission's findings were legally 
inadequate because they failed to set forth the undisputed facts of Petitioner's industrial 
injuries, and subsequent eight year history of leg and low-back symptoms and rejected that 
evidence without explanation. This Court, should also find that the Commission's findings 
were premised on legal error and that it abused its discretion when it objected undisputed 
record evidence of Mr. Blair's eight years of leg and low-back symptoms following his 
accident and that his leg and low-back symptoms had "essentially resolved eight years 
after the accident without explanation." 
Finally, Mr. Blair is not required to marshal the supporting evidence as to 
Petitioner's history of leg and low back symptoms because they were inadequate as a 
matter of law and marshaling is only appropriate where the facts are legally adequate. Nor 
is Mr. Blair required to marshal the evidence in support of the finding that his low back 
and leg symptoms had "essentially resolved," because there was no supporting evidence 
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DATED this __^^day of December, 2 t ; ^. 
KING&RURKk I". 
p*Uf\Y^ 
Richard R. Burke 
A ttorneys for Pe f i > 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the 2% clay of December, 2010,1 mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing BRIEF, first class postage prepaid, to the following: 
Thomas Sturdy 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC 
257 East 200 South, #800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Alan L. Hennebold 
Deputy Commissioner 
LABOR COMMISSION OF UTAH 
160 East 300 South, 3d Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
JZJJML 
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APPENDIX 
UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE Home | Site Map | Calendar | Code/Constitution | House | Senate | Search 
Title/Chapter/Section:] L O ^ I S l 
Utah Code 
Title 34A Utah Labor Code 
Chapter 1 Labor Commission Act 
Section 301 Commission jurisdiction and power. 
34A-1-301. Commission jurisdiction and power. 
The commission has the duty and the full power, jurisdiction, and authority to determine the facts and 
apply the law in this chapter or any other title or chapter it administers. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 375, 1997 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 34AQ1 030100.ZIP 1,553 Bytes 
« Previous Section (34A-1-205) Next Section (34A-1-302) » 
Questions/Comments | Utah State Home Page | Terms of Use/Privacy Policy 
Utah Code 
Title 34A Utah Labor Code 
Chapter 2 Workers' Compensation Act 
Section 105 Exclusive remedy against empk • v. • * > »•. 1 over 
J4A L- Mb. Exclusive remedy against employer, and officer, agent, or employee of employer. 
(1) 1 he right to recover compensation pursuant to this chapter for injuries sustained by an employee, 
whethci resulting in death or i .ot, is the exclusive remedy against the employer and is the exclusive 
reined} against am officer, agent, or employee of the employer and the liabilities of the employer 
imposed b\ this chapter is in place of any and all other civil liability whatsoever, at common law or 
otherwise, to the employee or to the employee's spouse, widow, children, parents, dependents, next of 
kin, heirs, personal representatives, guardian, or any other person whomsoever, on account of any 
accident or injury or death, in any way contracted, sustained, aggravated, or incurred by the employee in 
the course of or because of or arising out of the employee's employment, and an action, at law may not 
be maintained against an employer or against any officer, agent, or employee of the employer based 
upon any accident, injury, or death of an employee. Nothing in this section prevents an employee, or the 
employee's dependents, from filing a claim for compensation in those cases in accordance with Chapter 
3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
(2) The exclusive remedy provision,, oi iiu:, ,>caion apfnv ^ • -m mc uiem ana 
employer organization in a coemployment relationship regulated under Til lr " 1 \ -
 y *•>, 
Professional Employer Organization Licensing Ac! 
(3) (a) For purposes of this section: 
(i) 'Temporary employee" means an indi * idu.ii AIIW i* < i. u . i.r %ork assignment is: 
(A) an employee of a temporary staffing company: or 
(B) registered by or otherwise as>ocialed w ith a temporal) staffing company. 
(ii) "Temporary staffing compain" means a company that engages in the assignment ^ f indi\ uiuals as 
temporary full-time or nnrf-fimr r-nmipyC{^ *- •*H a Nmnmrnts ?h a finite ending date i- mother 
independent entity. 
(b) If the temporary staffing company secures the payment oi workers' compensation :i> aiu^-unce 
with Section 34A-2-201 for all temporary employees of the temporan .staffing eompam. die exclusive 
remedy provisions of this section apply to both the temporary staffing company and the client con-r 
and its employees and provide the temporaiy staffing company the same protection that a client 
company and its employees has under (his section for the acts of any of the temporary staffing 
company's tcmnr.raiy employees on assignment at the client company worksite. 
\mended b> (Ihaptei ^ 18, 2008 General Session 
I xmnload rode Section Zipped WordPerfect 34A02 010500.ZIP 3,218 Bytes 
«Previous Section (34A-2-104) Next Section i J4 . v _ i uo
 f ;> 
dtSearch 7.64 (7876) 
UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE Home | Site Map | Calendar | Code/Constitution | House ( Senate | Search 
Title/Chapter/Section: U ^ T t l l 
Utah Code 
Title 34A Utah Labor Code 
Chapter 2 Workers' Compensation Act 
Section 401 Compensation for industrial accidents to be paid. 
34A-2-401. Compensation for industrial accidents to be paid. 
(1) An employee described in Section 34A-2-104 who is injured and the dependents of each such 
employee who is killed, by accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment, 
wherever such injury occurred, if the accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid: 
(a) compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury or death; 
(b) the amount provided in this chapter for: 
(i) medical, nurse, and hospital services; 
(ii) medicines; and 
(iii) in case of death, the amount of funeral expenses. 
(2) The responsibility for compensation and payment of medical, nursing, and hospital services and 
medicines, and funeral expenses provided under this chapter shall be: 
(a) on the employer and the employer's insurance carrier; and 
(b) not on the employee. 
(3) Payment of benefits provided by this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, shall 
commence within 30 calendar days after any final award by the commission. 
Amended by Chapter 55, 1999 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 34A02 04Q10Q.ZIP 2,162 Bytes 
« Previous Section (34A-2-302) Next Section (34A-2-402)» 
Questions/Comments I Utah State Home Page 1 Terms of Use/Privacy Policy 
R602-I-2 LABOR (COMMISSION 162 
1. The day of the act, event, finding, or default, or the date 
a n Order is issued, shall not be included; 
2. The last day of the period so computed shall be included, 
unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a s tate legal holiday, in 
which event the period runs until the end of the next working 
day: 
3. When the period of time prescribed is less than seven 
days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and state legal holi-
days shall be excluded in the computation; 
4. No additional time for mailing will be allow* <l 
M82-1-2 . Witness Fees . 
Each witness who shall appear before the Commission by its 
order shall receive from the Commission for his/her atten-
dance fees and mileage as provided for witnesses by the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Otherwise, each party is required to 
subpoena witnesses at their own expense 
Refe rences : 34A-1-302, 63-46b-l et seq. 
History: 10879, AMD, 08/01/90, 10918, NSC, 07/10/90; 
10661, NSC, 07/25/90; 11470, AMD, 02/01/91; 13351, AMD, 
10/15/92; 13517, AMD, 12/01/92; 13518, AMD, 12/01/92; 
14635, AMD, 08/31/93; 15488, NSC, 03/01794; 15490, NSC, 
03/01/94; 17089, AMD, 08/31/95; 17524, NSC, 01/22/96; 17937, 
AMD, 10/01/96, 18179, AMD, 12/03/96; 19304, NSC, 07/01/97, 
20258, SYR, 11/24/97 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
App l i cab l e law. 
Rule requiring claimant's industrial accident be a "signifi-
cant" cause of disability when worker had already qualified for 
Social Security benefits and which was promulgated after 
worker's industrial accident, but before worker's application 
for a hearing before the Industrial Commission, could not be 
applied retroactively. The general rule in workers' compensa-
tion cases is that the court is to apply the law existing at the 
time of injury. (Former R490-1-17.) Abel v Industrial Comm'n, 
860 P.2d 367 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
R602-2. Adjudication of Workers' Compen-
sation and Occupational Disease Claims, 
R602-2-1. Pleadings and Discover). 
R602-2-2. Guidelines for Utilization of Medical Panel. 
R602-2-3. Compensation for Medical Testimonv 
R602-2-4. Attorney Fees 
:l602-2-5. Settlement Agreements 
X602-2-1. P l ead ings a n d Discovery. 
A. For the purposes of this rule, "Commission" means the 
^abor Commission. "Division" means the Division of Adjudi-
afcton within the Labor Commission. Adjudicative proceed-
ugs for workers' compensation and occupational disease 
laims may be commenced by the injured worker or dependent 
iling a request for agency action with the Commission. The 
administrative Law Judge is afforded discretion in allowing 
atervention of other parties pursuant to Section 63-46b-9 
l ie Application for Hearing is the request for agency action 
dl such applications shall include supporting medical docu-
mentation of the claim where there is a dispute over medical 
ssues. Applications without supporting documentation will 
fit be mailed to the employer or insurance carrier for answer 
mi l the appropriate documents have been provided. 
B. Whenever a claim for compensation benefits is denied by 
a employer or insurance carrier, the burden rests on the 
pphcant to initiate the action by filing an Application for 
fearing with the Commission 
C. When an Application for Hearing is filed with the 
Commission, the Commission shall forthwith mail a copy to 
the employer or to the employer's insurance carrier. 
D. The employer or insurance carrier shall have 30 days 
following the date of the mailing of the application to file a 
written answer with the Commission, admitting or denying 
liability for the claim. The answer shall state all affirmative 
defenses with sufficient accuracy and detail tha t an applicant 
may be fully informed of the nature of the defense asserted. All 
answers shall include a summary and categorization of ben-
efits paid to date on the claim. A copy shall be sent to the 
applicant or, if there is one, to the applicant's attorney by the 
defendant. 
E. When an employer or insurance carrier fails to file an 
answer within the 30 days provided above, the Commission 
may enter a default against such employer or insurance 
carrier. The Commission may then set the matter for hearing, 
take evidence bearing on the claim, and enter an Order based 
on the evidence presented. Such defaults may be set aside by 
following the procedure outlined in the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Said default shall apply to the defendant employer 
or insurance carrier and may not be construed to deprive the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund or the Uninsured Employers' 
Fund of any appropriate defenses. 
F When the answer denies liability solel> on the medical 
aspects of the case, the applicant, through his/her attorney or 
agent, and the employer or insurance carrier, with the ap-
proval of the Commission or its representative, may enter into 
a stipulated set of facts, which stipulation, together with the 
medical documents bearing on the case in the Commission's 
file, may be used in making the final determination of liability. 
G When deemed appropriate, the Commission or its repre-
sentatives may have a pre-hearing or post-hearing conference. 
H. Upon filing of the Answer, the defendant may commence 
discovery with appropriate sets of interrogatories. Such dis-
covery should focus on the accident event, witnesses, as well 
as past and present medical care. The defendant shall also be 
entitled to appropriately signed medical releases to allow 
gathering of pertinent medical records. The defendant may 
also require the applicant to submit to a medical examination 
by a physician of the defendant's choice. Failure of an appli-
cant to comply with such requests may result in the dismissal 
of a claim or a delay in the scheduling of a hearing. 
I Commission subpoena forms shall be used in all discovery 
proceedings and shall be signed, unless good cause is shown 
for a shorter period, at least one week prior to any scheduled 
hearing. 
J. All medical records shall be filed by the employer or its 
insurance carrier as a single joint exhibit at least one week 
before the scheduled hearing. Claimant must cooperate and 
submit all pertinent medical records contained in his/her file 
to the employer or its insurance carrier for the joint exhibit 
submission two weeks in advance of a scheduled hearing. 
Exhibits are to be placed in an indexed binder arranged by 
care provider in chronological order. Exhibits shall include all 
relevant treatment records which tend to prove or disprove a 
fact m issue. Pages shall be numbered consecutively. Hospital 
nurses' notes, duplicate materials, and other non-relevant 
materials may not be included. 
K The Administrative Law Judge shall be notified one week 
m advance of any proceeding when it is anticipated tha t more 
than four witnesses will be called, or where it is anticipated 
that the hearing of the evidence will require more than two 
hours. 
L. Decisions of the presiding officer in any adjudicative 
proceeding shall be issued m accordance with the provisions of 
Section 63-46b-5 or 63-46b-10. 
M. Any party to an adjudicative proceeding may obtain 
review of an Order issued by an Administrative Law Judge by 
